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Abstract  
Three main drivers underlie states’ intent to expand gas supply: energy security, 
geopolitics and climate goals. Such considerations also drive Greece’s expansive gas 
policy, but come with significant caveats. First, pipeline politics entails geopolitical 
costs and inflated anticipated gains. Second, while gas supply has yielded energy 
security for Greece, its cost-effectiveness is contentious. Third, the gas option obscures 
the transition to smart, clean energy sources and systems. A rational actor model within 
a rationalist-weak cognitivist framework can account for Greece’s gas policy. Yet, its 
limited success points to the need for a clean energy policy promising higher climate, 
energy and geopolitical gains.  
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Energy policy begins with decisions on the sources of energy. In Europe, natural gas has 
ascended to primacy since the 1970s for a mix of energy security, geopolitical and 
environmental reasons (Wybrew-Bond 1999, 7). This ascending trajectory has relaxed in the 
last decade, contrary to what proved to be over-optimistic projections of gas production, 
consumption and trade (Hartley and Medlock 2006), with the global financial crisis being only 
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a partial explanation for this outcome. Dwindling reserves in many producing countries, high 
upfront costs, tough geological conditions, inimical geopolitical environments that hinder the 
construction of ambitious infrastructure projects, and the return of coal and advent of 
renewables make up a picture less hospitable to the future of gas (Stern 1999).  
Leaving aside gas-rich states which have good reasons to perpetuate a gas-first policy 
(employment, boost of the domestic economy across the chain, export-born revenues), this 
article examines whether importing states should follow an expansive or retractive gas policy. 
In doing so, it debates the impact of the gas option on the energy security, geopolitical stand 
and climate policies of states that rely on gas use, and asks the following questions: 
 Does reliance on gas serve, or compromise, importing states’ energy security? 
 Does it enhance or compromise their geopolitical stand? 
 Does it serve or obstruct climate change goals? 
 
The article subsequently formulates three hypotheses, one for each issue-area, which eventually 
merge into one grand hypothesis: states that see substantial benefits in their energy security, 
geopolitical and climate policies through gas use are expected to pursue an expansive gas 
policy. States that do not, are expected to retract from clinging to gas and formulate alternative 
energy policies.  
The article tests these hypotheses in the case of Greece. The analysis is premised conceptually 
on the rational actor model that views states as rational, utilitarian agents pursuing the 
maximisation of their benefits (Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 18; Keohane 1993, 288; Baldwin 
1993, 9). Rationality, however, is always contingent upon time, place and the social context 
(Lamborn 1997), within which ideas are born and evolve into anchors of state policy (Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993). It is shaped by states’ strategic culture, which amounts to a set of ideas 
and shared assumptions among national policy-makers (Lock 2010). These frame the context 
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for decision-making and make it rational for one state to follow particular policy trajectories. 
Rationality hence incorporates actors’ perceptions of appropriateness, referring in this context 
to its cognitive dimension, and understood as the congruence of situations and issues with pre-
existing knowledge, experience and notions of suitability (March and Olsen 2004). Rationality, 
thus understood, comprises both causal and constitutive factors, which correspond to a logic of 
consequences and a logic of appropriateness/ suitability respectively (Hasenclever et al. 1997; 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Such an epistemology draws from both rationalist and weak 
cognitivist schools, but remains short of adopting a strong constructivist, intersubjective and 
identity-based discourse on policy.   
More specifically, it is argued that history and geography convey a strong realist flavour to 
Greek energy policy (the geopolitical driver), and membership in the EU and progressive 
Europeanisation a pronounced liberal one (markets-based energy security). These, it is argued, 
inform decisions on gas policy, and in so doing downplay the third driver, climate policy, both 
as a goal and as a means to address energy and geopolitical issues in novel ways.  
The next section elaborates on the three drivers of an expansive gas policy. After briefly setting 
the scene of the country’s energy policy, the following section discusses how Greece’s 
expansive gas policy, strongly informed by realist-liberal perspectives, fares in the energy 
security, climate and geopolitical realms. The case of Greece exemplifies the complexity of the 
issue, the underlying dilemmas, the spectre of the policy options and their potential 
implications. The conclusion sums up the debate and provides consequent policy 
recommendations. 
 
Exploring the grounds for an expansive gas policy  
Energy security  
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Energy security concerns secure supply of gas at affordable prices and in a sustainable way 
(Proedrou 2012, 3-4). These three dimensions, however, do not take up equal status: supply 
security is the utmost concern; when this is considered given, emphasis shifts to level of prices; 
the third dimension remains marginalised with respect to the other two (Helm 2014; Proedrou 
2017b). For the purposes of this article, sustainability is covered in the discussion of climate 
imperatives.  
For gas supply to be considered secure one or more of the following preconditions have to 
apply. Either a friendly state supplies gas on a stable and predictable basis (Norway-EU and 
Russia- Armenia gas relations fall into this category); or, the importing state enjoys a 
diversified portfolio, to the extent that any supply cuts from one supplier can be compensated 
by the other(s). The UK, importing gas from Norway, from different sources through pipelines 
linking it to the European mainland, and from distant suppliers via LNG is a good case in point 
(Demski et al. 2014). Diversification and liberalisation with an emphasis on ample 
infrastructure and storage capacity, though, boost the costs of gas supply, and hence also of 
final gas prices. Ensuring a multitude of energy corridors and capacity (slightly) higher than 
consumption implies costs that remain masked to consumers (Proedrou 2017c, 456). In 
addition, gas prices are macroscopically on the increase, mirroring ascending extraction costs 
in more challenging environments and high up-front costs, thus creating justifiable concerns as 
to the levels of affordability of future gas supply (Butler 2009, 129-31; Proedrou 2012). The 
recent dwindling gas prices render the cyclical problem of attracting investments for expensive 
infrastructure projects even more dire. This may squeeze supply in the next years and lead to 
higher prices until new transport schemes materialise, increasing traded quantities and restoring 
the market equilibrium (Stern 2017, 17-8). 
Energy security in many cases defies an objective status. Perceptions matter to such an extent 
that some states are concerned even with slight dependence on (perceived as) non-friendly 
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exporters, while other states feel comfortable with strong dependence on a single supplier, if 
deemed reliable (Casier 2011). Hence, political, historical, ideational and cultural factors 
constitute intervening variables in energy security understandings and account for the 
significant variation in perceptions among actors in the energy field. In cases where states find 
themselves largely dependent on a single supplier deemed unreliable and rival (see, for 
example, Poland and Lithuania vis-à-vis Russia), or have an insufficiently diversified portfolio 
(see EU-Russia), energy security is considered at risk (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011).  
Gas has been subject to securitisation exactly because of the regional nature of gas trade, the 
lack of alternative options and ensuing rigidity (Proedrou 2018a, 409-10; Skalamera 2018, 95). 
The ongoing globalisation of gas markets thus emerges as a welcome development for 
importers, in that it provides them with more options and more negotiating cards. This, 
however, can also be true for exporters, in the sense that they may acquire access to previously 
closed markets. In doing so, they may strike new commercial bargains, potentially at the cost 
of traditional customers (Grigas 2017). Market convergence also reinforces changes in 
commercial patterns and gas pricing formulas. The balance between traditional (long-term take 
or pay contracts at oil-pegged prices) and market-based commercial patterns (shorter contracts, 
exchanges in spot markets and prices defined through gas supply-demand dynamics) will tilt 
towards the latter the more gas markets become globalised, with regional markets operating at 
prices determined by global gas supply and demand dynamics (Kuzemko et al. 2015, 51). 
Although the current gas glut has facilitated access to and affordability of gas imports for 
consumers (50), market fundamentals could bring the opposite results in case supply tightens 
and/ or demand grows further (Hulbert and Goldthau 2013). In particular, the advent of the 
shale revolution has been a major driver of dwindling gas prices; in case shale gas is phased 
out either for economic (uncompetitive activity at low gas prices) or climate change reasons 
(see below) (Proedrou 2017b; 2018c), then one should expect a substantial rise in global gas 
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prices. All in all, participating in the globalizing gas markets may both enhance the importers’ 
energy security and endanger it, depending on the unfolding market dynamics.  
As long as gas supply derives from friendly states (or perceived as such) and/or a diversified 
portfolio of exporters, it is (perceived as) secure and serves energy security goals. To the extent 
that gas supply does not come at excessive costs, both for the country’s purchasing power level 
and in relation to other energy sources, gas supply is also deemed affordable and hence in line 
with energy security priorities. One could then expect states to pursue an expansive gas policy 
on energy security grounds.  
 
Geopolitical standing  
Exporter-importer commercial relations and energy infrastructure are tightly intertwined with 
states’ grand strategies; they translate into geopolitical leverage and constitute a means to 
achieve broader geopolitical goals (Proedrou 2018c; O’Sullivan 2013). Indeed, while made in 
the name of energy security, in many cases pipeline politics are more about geopolitical goals, 
national prestige and domestic goals, than energy security (Proedrou 2018a). That is why states 
engage in an active energy diplomacy. Attuning energy security prerogatives with broader 
foreign policy ambitions and putting them into synergistic use is a common feature of states’ 
grand strategies.  
Not only is gas trade with allies critical for energy security reasons, but geopolitical alliances 
are further cemented via energy cooperation (O’Sullivan 2013, 40-1). Frustrating cooperation 
within rival camps and weakening their cohesion, as well as constraining energy cooperation 
with/dependence on rival states at the same time, has always been a fundamental foreign policy 
goal. US Cold War and post-Cold War energy policy in Europe mirrors this strategic 
imperative. Breaking the Russian energy monopoly in Eurasia and restraining its market share 
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and ensuing geopolitical leverage has been an enduring priority of US foreign energy policy 
(Stern 1999, 153; Cornell et al. 2005, 31; Gallis 2007).  
While this is a clear-cut case, others are much more complex. States belong to different 
constellations of alliances with partially overlapping memberships; these embody all sorts of 
bilateral relationships extending from openly rival to secure and friendly. States hence are 
implicated in an intriguing web of interlinked issues and contrasting interests, which may pit 
them against other countries, or place them in the uneasy position of having to choose sides in 
an unfolding battle between different partners (Boyle 2016). Southeast European states, for 
example, are under pressure from both the US and Russia to follow different energy paths 
(Leonard and Popescu 2017; Maltby 2015).  
In a nutshell, prioritizing gas supply makes sense in case this is in line with broader geopolitical 
interests/preconditions. As long as gas trade and diplomacy does not compromise, but rather 
works in a supportive mode to states’ grand strategies, states are expected to follow an 
expansive gas policy.  
 
Climate change 
With the advent of climate change energy and climate policy have become closely interlinked 
(Bradshaw 2014; Kuzemko et al. 2015). In light of the pressing need for stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and adherence to strict carbon budgets, it is argued that in this critical 
juncture natural gas constitutes the ideal bridge fuel. This is so because stable energy flows can 
thus be maintained with lower emissions compared to coal- and oil-based energy consumption, 
allowing time for technology to provide cleaner solutions more efficiently (Franza et al. 2016; 
Kuzemko et al. 2015, 49, 121). In fact, the coal-to-gas switch brought down gas emissions 
significantly in the UK in the 1990s, in Poland in the 2000s and in the US in the 2010s 
(Kuzemko et al. 2015, 116, 121; Judge and Maltby 2017, 21).  
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However, this discussion merits further qualification. It is essential to make it clear that while 
gas is cleaner than oil and coal, it still emits and thus remains inferior to renewable solutions. 
Accordingly, gas proponents implicitly compare gas with other fossil fuels, while gas critiques 
do so vis-à-vis renewables. A number of caveats also remain. First, as a fossil fuel, gas presents 
many drawbacks (dirty exploration, pollution, damage to ecosystems, water intensity, non-
renewable and hence peak concerns for the future, and dependence on resources unequally 
scattered around the world). Secondly, natural gas also includes shale gas: in terms of water 
intensity, ecological damage and methane and carbon emissions, shale gas is far from 
environment-friendly; in many cases it is deemed more harmful even than coal (Bradshaw 
2014, 61-69; Stern 2017, 13). Low gas prices have partially been an effect of the shale 
revolution; while shale gas makes overall gas trade more competitive and hence affordable for 
importers, restricting shale gas for climate reasons would effectively increase gas prices. A 
clear trade-off between affordability and sustainability is at play here; it seems that gas cannot 
be at the same time both economic and climate-friendly (Proedrou 2017b, 194). Thirdly, 
contemporary investments in gas will translate into substantial lock-in effects further in the 
future, thus weakening the argument that gas will pave the way for cleaner forms of energy 
(Kuzemko et al. 2015, 49, 121).  
In short, gas is a transition fuel only to the extent that it replaces coal and oil, and neither 
implicates the advent of shale gas, nor prevents the emergence and upscale of cleaner forms of 
energy. In these cases, natural gas can strengthen climate policy. 
 
The case of Greece  
Greece first imported gas in the mid-1970s. Four decades later, natural gas imports amount to 
4.1 billion cubic meters (bcm), a 23 percent rise since 2006. This corresponds to a 15 percent 
share of total primary energy supply, 28 percent of electricity generation, and a still small but 
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rapidly rising share in total final consumption over the last decade. Gas use has penetrated 
mostly the heat/ power generation and industrial sectors, a development that has become 
conspicuous with the expansion of the domestic gas pipeline system to reach more consumers. 
Although the severe financial crisis brought a temporary decline in gas use in the early 2010s, 
gas consumption is again on the increase (IEA 2017, 43-4), with projections for 2020 and 2030 
showing a relative stabilisation of gas consumption (Honore 2014, 111).   
Since the late 2000s, Greece’s gasification policy neatly matches its vibrant gas diplomacy. In 
particular, Greece has given its explicit support to infrastructure projects in its neighbourhood 
that involve it, and has repeatedly declared its ambition to increase its gas imports and become 
a gas hub in southeast Europe (Hellenic Republic - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017; Jirušek 
et al. 2017, 340). The first such scheme was the Interconnector, linking the South Caucasus 
gas pipeline to Greece via Turkey. Greece was also eager to participate in the Russia-led South 
Stream pipeline (Jirušek et al. 2017, 340),  and, once this was scrapped, to the Italy-Greece 
Interconnector/Poseidon pipeline (Siddi 2017, 12). At the same time, Greece joined the 
ongoing Transadriatic pipeline (TAP) project (Siddi 2017). Greece also struck a deal with 
Cyprus, Israel and Italy for the construction of the EastMed pipeline that is to ship East 
Mediterranean gas via Greece westwards (Prontera 2017, 218-9). Greece has already expanded 
the receiving capacity of its main LNG terminal at Revythousa, and is examining the option of 









Table 1: Greece’s participation in regional gas infrastructure 
Pipelines LNG 
EastMed is designed to to ship East 
Mediterranean (Israeli/Cypriot) gas via 
Greece 
Expansion of Revythousa LNG terminal 
(Algerian gas) 
IGI/Poseidon is designed to carry Azeri 
(and potentially further into the future 
Caspian, Central Asian and Middle 
Eastern) gas to Italy via Greece 
Construction of new LNG terminal 
(Algerian gas) 
Interconnector linking South Caucasus gas 
pipeline (starting in Azerbaijan and 
shipping Azeri gas) to Greece via Turkey 
 
South Stream was designed to carry 
Russian gas under the Black Sea to 
Bulgaria, and from there to expand to 
Greece and other European countries 
westwards 
 
Transadriatic (TAP) is under construction 
to connecting Italy with Greece carrying 
Azeri gas  
 
Turkish Stream is designed to ship Russian 
gas under the Black Sea to Turkey. It could 





The historical, social and ideational context shapes Greek policymakers’ rationale. A turbulent 
geopolitical environment conveys a strong realist flavour to Greece’s international posturing, 
which has progressively been influenced by Europeanisation and a liberal approach/ agenda 
(Tsakonas 2010; Heraclides 2010). With this conceptual mindset, it is fitting for Greek 
policymakers to link energy security with liberal markets and geopolitics, which converge in a 
preference for pipeline politics (logic of appropriateness/ suitability) (Proedrou 2018a). The 
assumption that pipeline deals can yield both energy and geopolitical benefits sets in motion 
the logic of consequences driving pipeline diplomacy. However, such a logic of 
appropriateness/ suitability does not take into consideration climate policy, as climate policy 
remains unlinked to energy security and geopolitics even though, it is argued, the benefits 
deriving from a ground-breaking climate policy are superior to those from conventional gas 
pipeline politics. The logic of consequences should drive Greece to tap into such benefits; this, 
however, presupposes social learning, a revisiting of mainstream realist-liberal conceptual 
underpinnings, and a concomitant shift in perceptions regarding the synergies between 
geopolitics, energy and climate goals.  
  
Markets-based energy security: gains and caveats 
Greek energy security is premised upon the competitive and diversified function of liberal 
energy markets. Natural gas, in this context, constitutes a significant pillar of Greece’s energy 
security policy, adding another fuel and thus diversifying energy sources. Importantly, gas 
imports have been reliable, and constitute stable energy flows to the Greek economy. The only 
exception has been the Russo-Ukrainian crisis that led to a halt in deliveries throughout 
future and hence carry Russian gas to 
Greece and Western Europe 
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southeast Europe for more than two weeks in early 2009. This episode made evident Greece’s 
reliance on a single route for Russian gas (Richter and Holz 2015, 179). Greece, like other 
customers, was held hostage to a politico-economic conflict between Russia and transit country 
Ukraine. In this context, Greece’s eagerness to embrace the South Stream project made sense, 
as it would create a more secure route bypassing Ukraine. Positive perceptions of Russia as a 
traditionally friendly partner also assuaged fears of Russia assuming a hostile energy policy 
vis-à-vis Greece (Jirušek et al. 2017, 340). Moreover, Greece’s resilience was remarkable. 
Contracted quantities and agreements for further LNG shipments from Algeria (albeit at higher 
prices) allowed Greece to weather the crisis comfortably, even if it had been prolonged. 
Greece’s gas diversification policy, in other words, ensured steady supply security even under 
adverse conditions (Kovacevic 2009, 10-11).  
A significant caveat of Greece’s evolving energy security policy is that diversification through 
Azeri gas via the Interconnector creates dependency on transit through Turkey. Such 
dependency might not have been so problematic when Greek-Turkish relations were going 
through a positive phase, as was the case in the late 1990s. With the heightened bilateral rivalry 
around the Aegean and Cyprus however, it is in Greece’s interest to keep incoming Azeri 
energy quantities transiting through Turkey (for own Greek use) to a minimum. Such concerns 
are further extenuated in case Turkish Stream, a pipeline currently under construction that will 
carry Russian gas to Turkey, (this has not been mentioned ?) feeds the IGI/Poseidon pipeline, 
effectively substituting the central corridor shipping Russian gas via Ukraine (this is not in the 
table). As recent interruption crises have shown, when the stakes are high, states are not 
dissuaded by implicated penalties, and economic and reputational damage from using energy 
as a weapon (is this correct as I have put it ?). Transit dependence on a traditional foe hence 
constitutes a potential risk for Greek energy security (Proedrou 2015; Proedrou 2017a, 31).  
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From an affordability perspective, Greece’s pipeline diplomacy has targeted transit fees, which 
amounts to discounted gas deliveries. Greece has also managed to renegotiate existing contracts 
with Russia, against a background of falling gas prices in spot markets, thereby attaining 
significant discounts for gas supplies, even though the fact that they remain tied to the price of 
oil does not assuage concerns for future price volatility (Proedrou 2018b, 81). Moreover, the 
increase in gas supplies, especially over the last fifteen years, requires an extension of domestic 
gas infrastructure, which increases retail prices.   
More broadly, Greek energy security is contingent upon the geopolitical imperatives that will 
mould the strategic decisions of the principal stakeholders (US, China, Qatar, Russia), and 
define the market fundamentals (supply-demand dynamics, regulatory framework, price 
formulas and contractual patterns) of future gas geopolitics (Hulbert and Goldthau 2013). 
Furthermore, low prices discourage energy infrastructure investments in the current 
conjuncture. New pipelines are uneconomic to build and, hence, more often than not do not 
make it to the implementation stage (Proedrou 2018a). This paves the way for higher prices in 
the future since, when more supply becomes available, the infrastructure to ship this gas will 
be absent, further influencing supply-demand dynamics (Proedrou 2018c; Stern 2017). The 
incongruent time-scales of gas business projects and energy security imperatives make this a 
significant caveat for Greek gas security as well.   
In all, there are limits to how far liberal gas policies can ensure gas security. Greece’s market-
based energy approach hence calls for some revisiting, in line with the broader EU external gas 






Aspiring to geopolitical benefits through energy 
Greece has three intertwined grand strategy goals. The one is to act as an anchor of stability in 
its broader neighbourhood. The second is the peaceful resolution of open disputes with 
neighbours, primarily Turkey, within the framework of international law and treaties (Dokos 
and Tsakonas 2003; Tsakonas 2010; Heraclides 2010). The third is to retain a relative balance 
of power with, and leverage its own position vis-à-vis, Turkey, with an eye to thwarting any 
unilateral Turkish moves that could threaten Greece’s sovereign rights. In this context, Greek 
foreign policy is solidly tied to and embedded in US-led NATO. Nevertheless, NATO’s lack 
of security guarantees to Greece vis-à-vis fellow NATO member Turkey, and perceptions of 
constant Russo-Turkish friction, reinforce Greece’s drive to maintain amiable relations, open 
channels of political communication and alliance rhetoric, and significant military trade ties 
with Russia (Tziampiris 2010). Greece’s membership in the EU provides additional channels 
for Greek foreign policy and diplomacy and implicit guarantees of solidarity in case of Turkish 
aggressiveness.  Becoming an energy hub may provide further guarantees to Greece’s security 
and territorial integrity. 
Greek proclivity to support the EU gas diversification agenda is dictated by Greece’s grand 
strategy. First, entering the pipeline map and becoming an essential transit country will amplify 
Greek geopolitical leverage. Second, transit status provides an extra negotiating card for the 
country, which can be used in negotiations through issue-linkages (Proedrou 2018a, 411). 
These considerations remain vague, however, and have yet to be translated into tangible 
outcomes in the service of (any of) Greece’s three principal foreign policy goals.  
The above notwithstanding, underneath Greece’s gas diplomacy lurk two contradictions. First, 
the energy security discourse is dominated by the stark divide and incoherence between a 
Russia-centric and an anti-Russian (translated in policy terms in US-friendly) perspective. The 
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latter sees dependence on Russian gas as dangerous and advocates a reduction of gas imports 
from, and no further infrastructure deals with, Russia. The former prioritises good relations 
with Russia to ensure stable gas flows and enhance energy security (Proedrou 2017b, 91-99). 
This feeds into an ambiguous gas diplomacy. On the one hand, Greece lies in the frontline of 
diversification projects, such as the Interconnector, TAP and EastMed pipelines and LNG 
receiving terminals, which serve US geopolitical interests. At the same time, Greece endorsed 
and joined the Russia-sponsored South Stream project and, subsequently, the IGI/Poseidon 
project that is designed to link up to Turkish Stream, both of which would perpetuate Greek 
and aggravate EU dependence on Russian gas. At a regulatory level in the EU context, Greece 
has backed a conciliatory stance that would allow Gazprom to maintain its EU market share, 
rather than sided with those members pushing for effective limitation of Gazprom’s share in 
the EU market (Leonard and Popescu 2017, 27-9). As a result, Greece seems to oscillate 
between policies that play to both Russian and US energy interests. This contrasts with its more 
refined foreign policy approach and may either compromise Greece’s ability to stick to its 
foreign policy priorities, or undermine its energy security.   
Secondly, Greece aims to advance its own geopolitical standing not only in vague, absolute 
terms, but also in relative terms, vis-à-vis Turkey. This competition is explicit, also taking into 
account Turkey’s declared goal to evolve into an energy hub, and is played out across two 
antithetical and mutually exclusive transport projects: South Stream vs. Turkish Stream, and 
the EastMed pipeline vs. a pipeline shipping Israeli gas to Turkey (the TAP project advances 
both countries’ interests in a non-conflictive way as it is transit-only for Greece). In the latter 
antithetical pair, options via Turkey have been muted for geopolitical reasons, but the EastMed 
option still comes up against significant obstacles. These include complicated geopolitics, low 
gas prices to finance new infrastructure, and difficulties in increasing regional supply enough 
to justify the cost of expensive pipelines (Prontera and Ruszel 2017). The prospects hence 
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remain bleak for any pipeline project carrying East Mediterranean gas, let alone for both of 
them, to materialise (Baconi 2017).  
Contrary to this lose-lose case, in the former (antithetical pair) Turkish Stream has won over 
South Stream; in case Greece aspires to become a transit state as well, this will be done in 
tandem with, rather than at the cost of Turkey’s emerging gas hub status. This is an 
asymmetrical win-win situation as Turkey’s emerging gas hub status is superior to Greece’s 
transit status, and conveys more leverage to Turkey than to Greece, especially if one takes into 
account the energy security dimension analysed above. Hence, all in all, Greek endeavours to 
reap geopolitical benefits through energy remain inconclusive at best, counter-productive at 
worst.  
 
Realist and liberal lenses undermine the climate driver  
Greece’s expansive gas policy must also be conceptualised within Greece’s uptake of climate 
responsibility in the context of the EU’s Kyoto Protocol commitments and Emissions Trading 
System, the EU’s 20-20-20 goals for 2020 and the 40-40-27 goals for 2030, and further 
commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement (Pelerin-Carlin 2017). In particular, gas is seen 
as a greener fuel that can help fulfil Greece’s emission reduction targets, by covering the gap 
of diminishing domestic coal production. Nevertheless, coal remains the second most used fuel 
behind oil. Strikingly, while decommissioning old coal-fired plants, Greece is also planning to 
build two modern lignite-fired plants (IEA 2017, 66). This weakens the argument that gas 
displaces coal and hence serves climate purposes. At the same time, the penetration of gas has 
left the primary role of oil intact (amounting to half the country’s energy consumption). This 
is because, while compressed natural gas has made some inroads as a transport fuel for vehicles, 
it is not used by trucks and ships in LNG form (19-20). Moreover, Greece’s participation in the 
globalizing gas market through its (even if marginal) gas demand indirectly encourages shale 
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gas exploration, a factor undermining climate goals. At the same time, gas contracts extending 
into the future, internal gas infrastructure and gas diplomacy aspiring to render the country a 
gas hub are bound to create significant lock-ins. With new lignite-fired plants under 
construction and oil’s high share intact, the scope for cleaner forms of energy dominating the 
market is limited, ironically just at a time when renewables have become competitive 
(Kuzemko et al. 2015, 122). While Greece is on the path to achieving its 18 percent renewable 
share commitment (which it unilaterally raised to 20 percent) by 2020 (IEA 2017, 67, 88, 101), 
one could make a strong case that alternative policies would constitute substantially superior 
options.  
This argument has several converging threads. Firstly, Greece is a sun-lit and wind-endowed 
country; the potential for solar and wind power to replace coal thus seems much greater than 
increasing gas imports. The country has opted for a bulk utility model to supply the central grid 
with renewable sources of energy (Leal-Arcas et al. 2017, 165),  but has done so only to reach 
the modest goals set, much below other countries, such as Spain (Solorio and Fernandez 2017). 
At the same time, while priority access to the grid is maintained for renewables, feed-in tariffs 
have been phased out and replaced by bidding systems and feed-in-premiums (Hellenic 
Republic - Ministry of Environment 2016),  a development that is very likely to weaken 
incentives for investors, as has been the case in other countries (Balcombe et al. 2014). 
Moreover, Greece is investing in a policy to connect its islands with the mainland grid (IEA 
2017). Yet, in light of the decentralised nature of the country’s geography, its hundreds of 
dispersed islands and spacious rural, mountainous areas would benefit much more from a 
decentralised energy model including stand-alone, off-grid systems and community energy 
projects. Only pilot projects of this kind are currently in operation (see, for example, 
WiseGRID 2019), a fact paying lip service to the circumscribed and delayed emphasis ceded 
to this potential. The law that allows citizens to produce energy to cover part of their own needs 
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(self-consumption) was only passed in 2016, and it remains to be seen what incentives will be 
given for such schemes (Leal-Arcas et al. 2017, 164-5).  
Furthermore, the electricity markets are undergoing wide-ranging reform, creating 
opportunities on both the supply and demand sides (Parag and Sovacool 2016). The 
introduction of demand response management remains sluggish in Greek households. Load-
shedding remains the sole option for balancing the grid, which takes place in a day-ahead 
market, as an intra-day and a balancing market remain undeveloped (IEA 2017, 61). Smart 
grids, smart meters and in-home automation displays have not been built and developed; as a 
result, the potential for rationalizing and minimizing energy use, and rendering it more 
efficient, is wasted. That said, Greece is working towards the implementation of the EU energy 
acquis and the full liberalisation/ deregulation of its electricity market (IEA 2017). Still, it has 
yet to establish a functioning, networked, smart, clean and efficient prosumers’ market and 
reap the benefits other much less sun-lit countries enjoy (Leal-Arcas et al. 2017, 166-7). 
One might counter that the costs involved in such an extensive overhaul of the energy system, 
together with potential contingencies upon third parties across the supply chain, weaken the 
argument presented here. Yet, such investments regard energy flows, rather than stocks, 
meaning that dependence is not prolonged into the future. Furthermore, all investments into 
the domestic economy differ qualitatively from foreign exchange raised to pay for fossil fuel 
imports in that they constitute financial multipliers that trickle down to the domestic economy 
and society (Proedrou 2017c). Such funds can originate from EU structural funds. They can 
also displace poorly targeted support measures: for example, support mechanisms for clean 
energy investments can be advanced instead of subsidised electricity prices and oil purchases. 
Such schemes can be sustainably refinanced by a national fund that would be credited with the 
money saved from the lower foreign exchange needed to purchase oil and gas. Yet, Greece 
fails to tap into the benefits deriving from such a fast-track energy transition, as the conceptual 
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link between climate policy, energy security and geopolitics remains frail, with no evidence 
that Greek policymakers view the three realms as connected. On the contrary, liberal and realist 
understandings of energy security are explicit and predominate, providing specific trajectories 
to energy policy via a preference for gas pipeline politics. 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
This article has attempted to provide objective grounds for an expansive gas policy, and 
juxtaposed them to the effects of Greece’s gas policy across the country’s geopolitical, energy 
and climate goals. The findings reveal persistent difficulties in reaping geopolitical fruits 
through energy, as well as geopolitically induced limits to liberal energy security approaches. 
Together with the small climate benefits of an expansive gas policy, they lend only limited 
support to Greece’s current expansive gas policy. The question that logically emerges is why, 
Greece, a rational actor, pursues such a course. The main argument is that the country’s 
strategic culture, its history of turbulent relations with neighbours, foremost Turkey, and its 
membership in the liberal-minded EU, have informed the rationale and framed the context 
within which Greek policymakers view the gas option. Due to an entrenched link between 
energy security and both liberal markets and geopolitics (logic of appropriateness/ suitability) 
and in order to reap energy and geopolitical benefits (logic of consequences), Greek gas policy 
is anchored in pipeline politics, despite the implied energy security and geopolitical trade-offs 
that call for more policy attention.  
One could counterargue that Greece’s gas policy is consonant with the country’s domestic gas 
exploration strategy. Greek gas policy hence should not be dismissed as sub-optimally rational. 
The gas potential of the country, however, remains unproven and a mid-term prospect at best, 
while contravening the quest towards fossil divestment, carbon bubble concerns and climate 
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policy. The real value of future gas production moreover is mired in uncertainty, as it will be 
contingent on the future shape of gas markets and climate imperatives. 
The realist-liberal informed rationale blurs another promising option for Greece: a 
comprehensive clean energy agenda that can yield superior climate performance and energy 
security, while avoiding current geopolitical adversities and potentially opening up interesting 
new geopolitical trajectories. This cannot be explained in terms of the logic of consequences; 
exactly the opposite, while multiple benefits exist, the conceptual mindset to link climate, 
energy and geopolitical realms is lacking. Social learning can create adaptation dynamics and 
give birth to a novel logic of appropriateness/ suitability, in which clean energy markets can 
address climate, energy and to some extent geopolitical issues.    
In particular, the establishment of clean energy markets achieves diversification of the energy 
mix with domestic, reliable energy sources; minimises dependence on external suppliers; 
foregoes the need for costly infrastructure to afford a diversified portfolio, which raises final 
prices; and minimizes uncertainty deriving from remote centres of decision-making regarding 
gas geopolitics and markets (Siddi 2017).  
On the geopolitical front, a sustainable energy approach would decrease diplomatic costs and 
the contradictions inherent in the country’s gas diplomacy; eliminate the need to devote 
excessive political energy to gas diplomacy; and not generate/ rely upon inflated expectations. 
It could be contested that the overhaul of the energy system would mean that Greece would 
withdraw from gas diplomacy and that, presumably, this would enhance Turkey’s energy and 
geopolitical role in the region, thus harming Greece’s central interests. Yet, Greece’s pipeline 
diplomacy does not manage to undermine that of Turkey; Greece still struggles to press forward 
with EastMed, while Turkish Stream has won over South Stream. At the same time, Greece 
could influence broader energy developments in southeast Europe by the power of example 
rather than the power of diplomacy. By putting in place resilient, clean-sourced, smart energy 
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systems, it can provide useful blueprints and know-how for the diffusion of alternative modes 
of energy security; showcase that energy security can be achieved with a retractive gas policy; 
and contribute to a revisiting of gas-first policies in southeast Europe and the EU in general. 
Rather than aiming to strike victories in the gas field, an alternative proposal for energy 
diplomacy is a strategy aiming to shift from the geopolitical gas game to the establishment of 
clean energy systems (Siddi 2017).  
In climate change terms, lastly, the superiority of this option is evident, as it trades clean for 
fossil energy and fares better across the country’s three entrenched climate targets. This 
cumulative appraisal opens up the wider debate of the prudence of an expansive Greek gas 
policy, and strengthens the case for revisiting the gas option altogether.  
 
Note on Contributor 
Filippos Proedrou is Research Fellow in the University of South Wales, Cardiff, UK. 
 
References 
Baconi, T. 2017. Pipelines and Pipedreams. How the EU Can Support a Regional Gas Hub 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. ECFR Policy Brief. London: ECFR, April. 
https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR211_-_PIPELINES_AND_PIPEDREAMS.pdf. 
Balcombe P., Rigby, D., and Azapagic, A. 2014. Investigating the Importance of 
Motivations and Barriers Related to Microgeneration Uptake in the UK. Applied Energy 
130: 403–18. 
Baldwin, D. 1993. Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics. In D. Baldwin, ed. 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate: 3-27. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
22 
 
Barnett, M., and Finnemore, M. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in 
Global Politics. New York: Cornell University Press.  
Boersma, T., and Goldthau, A. 2017. Wither the EU’s Market Making Project in Energy: 
From Liberalization to Securitization? In S. Andersen, and A. Goldthau, eds. Energy 
Union. Europe's New Liberal Mercantilism?: 99-113. London: Palgrave.  
Boyle, M. 2016. The Coming Illiberal Order. Survival 58 (2): 35–66. 
Bradshaw, M. 2014. Global Energy Dilemmas: Energy Security, Globalization, and 
Climate Change. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Butler, N. 2009.Why We Need a Common European Energy Policy. In L. Tsoukalis, ed. 
The EU in a World in Transition: Fit for what Purpose?: 129-40. London: Policy Network.  
Casier, T. 2011. The Rise of Energy to the Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From 
Interdependence to Dependence? Geopolitics 16 (3): 536-52. 
Cornell, S., Tsereteli, M., and Socor, V. 2005. Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. In S.F. Starr and S. Cornell, eds. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Pipeline: Oil Window to the West: 17-38. Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & 
Silk Road Studies Program.  
Demski, C., Poortinga, W., and Pidgeon, N. 2014. Exploring Public Perceptions of Energy 
Security Risks in the UK. Energy Policy 66: 369-78. 
Dokos, T., and Tsakonas, P. 2003. Greek–Turkish Relations in the post-Cold War Era. In 
C. Kollias, and G. Gunluk-Senesen, eds. Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century. The 
Political Economy Perspective: 9-35. New York: Nova Science Publishers.  
Franza, L., de Jong, D. and van der Linde, C. 2016. The Future of Gas: The Transition 
Fuel? In S. Colombo, M. El Harrak, and N. Sartori, eds. The Future of Natural Gas. Markets 
and Geopolitics: 26-40. The Netherlands: IAI/OCP.  
23 
 
Gallis, P. 2007. CRS Report for Congress: NATO and Energy Security. Washington DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 15 August. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22409.pdf 
Goldstein, J., and Keohane, R. eds. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, 
and Political Change. New York: Cornell University Press.  
Grigas, A. 2017. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Harvard: Harvard University Press.  
Hartley, P., and Medlock, K. III. 2006. The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model. In D. 
Victor, A. Jaffe, and M. Hayes, eds. Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040: 
357-406. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V. 1997.Theories of International Regimes. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hellenic Republic - Ministry of Environment. 2016. Energy and Climate Change. New RES 
Support Scheme. Law 4414/2016.  
Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2017. Energy Diplomacy, April. 
https://www.mfa.gr/en/energy-diplomacy/ 
Helm, D. 2014. The European Framework for Energy and Climate Policies. Energy Policy 
64 (January): 29-35. 
Heraclides, A. 2010. The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Honoré, A. 2014. The Outlook for Natural Gas Demand in Europe. OIES NG 87. Oxford: 
OIES. June. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/NG-
87.pdf. 
Hulbert, M., and Goldthau, A. 2013. Natural Gas Going Global? Potential and Pitfalls. In 








Jirušek, M., Vlček, T., and Henderson, J. 2017. Russia’s Energy Relations in Southeastern 
Europe: An Analysis of Motives in Bulgaria and Greece. Post-Soviet Affairs 33 (5): 335-
55. 
Judge, A., and Maltby, T. 2017. European Energy Union? Caught between Securitisation 
and ‘Riskification’. European Journal of International Security 2 (2): 179-202. 
Keohane, R. 1993. Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War. In D. 
Baldwin, ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate: 269-300. New 
York: Columbia University Press.  
Kovacevic, A. 2009. The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in South Eastern Europe. 




Kuzemko, C., Goldthau, A., and Keating, M. 2015. The Global Energy Challenge: 
Environment, Development and Security. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Lamborn, A. 1997. Theory and the Politics in World Politics. International Studies 
Quarterly 41 (2): 187-214. 
Leal-Arcas, R., Lesniewska, F., and Proedrou, F. 2017. Prosumers: New Actors in EU 
Energy Security. Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 48, Chap 5: 139-70. 




Leonard, M., and Popescu, N. 2017. A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations. ECFR Policy 
Paper. London: ECFR. November. https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR-
02_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-RUSSIA_RELATIONS.pdf  




Maltby, T. 2015. Between Amity, Enmity and Europeanisation: EU Energy Security Policy 
and the Example of Bulgaria's Russian Energy Dependence. Europe-Asia Studies 67 (5): 
809-30. 
March, J, and Olsen, J. 2004. The Logic of Appropriateness. The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxf
ordhb-9780199604456-e-024 . 
O’Sullivan, M. 2013.The Entanglement of Energy, Grand Strategy, and International 
Security. In A. Goldthau, ed. The Handbook of Global Energy Policy: 30-47. Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell.  
Parag, Y., and Sovacool, B. 2016. Electricity Market Design for the Prosumer Era. Nature 
Energy 1 (4): 1-6. 
Pellerin-Carlin, T. 2017. The EU Energy Union. In R. Leal-Arcas, and J. Wouters, eds. 
Research Handbook for EU Energy Law and Policy: 67-102. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Proedrou, F. 2012. EU Energy Security in the Gas Sector: Evolving Dynamics, Policy 
Dilemmas and Prospects. Surrey: Ashgate.  
26 
 
Proedrou, F. 2015. What is the Turkish Stream and Why Does it Matter? Central European 
Journal of International and Security Studies eContribution. 
http://www.cejiss.org/econtribution/what-is-the-turkish-stream-and-why-does-it-matter 
Proedrou, F. 2017a. Why Russian Gas Diplomacy Fails: The Geopolitics-Energy Nexus in 
Ukraine and Turkey. Asia Europe Journal 15 (1): 21-37. 
Proedrou, F. 2017b. A New Framework for EU Energy Security: Putting Sustainability 
First. European Politics and Society 18 (2): 182-98. 
Proedrou, F. 2017c. Are Smart Grids the Key to EU Energy Security? In R. Leal-Arcas, 
and J. Wouters, eds. Research Handbook for EU Energy Law and Policy: 450-9. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Proedrou, F. 2018a. Revisiting Pipeline Politics and Diplomacy: From Energy Security to 
Domestic Politics Explanations. Problems of Post-Communism 65 (6): 409-418.  
Proedrou, F. 2018b. Russian Energy Policy and Structural Power in Europe. Europe-Asia 
Studies 70 (1): 75-89. 
Proedrou, F. 2018c. Energy Policy and Security under Climate Change. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Prontera, A. 2017. The New Politics of Energy Security in the European Union and Beyond: 
States, Markets, Institutions. London and New York: Routledge.  
Prontera, A., and Ruszel, M. 2017. Energy Security in the East Mediterranean. Middle East 
Policy 24 (3): 145-62. 
Richter, P., and Holz, F. 2015. All Quiet on the Eastern Front? Disruption Scenarios of 
Russian Natural Gas Supply to Europe. Energy Policy 80: 177-89. 
Schmidt-Felzmann, A. 2011. EU Member States' Energy Relations with Russia: 
Conflicting Approaches to Securing Natural Gas Supplies. Geopolitics 16 (3): 574-99. 
27 
 
Siddi, M. 2017. The Southern Gas Corridor. Challenges to a Geopolitical Approach in the 
EU’s External Energy Policy. FIIA Briefing Paper 216. Helsinki: FIIA, March. 
https://storage.googleapis.com/upi-live/2017/04/bp216_the_southern_gas_corridor.pdf  
Siddi, M. 2017. The EU’s Botched Geopolitical Approach to External Energy Policy: The 
Case of the Southern Gas Corridor. Geopolitics Online first. 
Skalamera, M. 2018. Explaining the 2014 Sino-Russian Gas Breakthrough: The Primacy 
of Domestic Politics. Europe-Asia Studies 70 (1): 90-107. 
Solorio, I., and Fernandez. R. 2017. Spain and Renewable Energy Promotion: 
Europeanization Upside Down. In I. Solorio, and H. Jörgens, eds. A Guide to EU 
Renewable Energy Policy. Comparing Europeanization and Domestic Policy Change in 
EU Member States: 141-161. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Stern, J. 1999. Soviet and Russian Gas: The Origins and Evolution of Gazprom’s Export 
Strategy. In I. Mabro, and I. Wybrew-Bond, eds. Gas to Europe: The Strategies of Four 
Main Suppliers: 135-200. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Stern, J. 2017. The Future of Gas in Decarbonising European Energy Markets. OIES NG 
116. Oxford: OIES, January. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/The-Future-of-Gas-in-Decarbonising-European-Energy-
Markets-the-need-for-a-new-approach-NG-116.pdf  
Tsakonas, P. 2010. The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations: Grasping 
Greece’s Socialization Strategy. New York: Springer.  
Tziampiris, A. 2010. Greek Foreign Policy and Russia: Political Realignment, 
Civilizational Aspects, and Realism. Mediterranean Quarterly 21 (2): 78-89. 
WiseGRID. 2019. https://www.wisegrid.eu/ 
Wybrew-Bond, I. 1999. Setting the Scene. In I. Mabro, and I. Wybrew-Bond, eds. Gas to 
Europe: The Strategies of Four Main Suppliers: 5-32. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
28 
 
 
 
 
 
